The Timing of Climate Change Policies

Geoffrey Heal Columbia Business School Questions raised by economic analysis of climate change

Is it worth taking action against climate change
If yes, how much action should we take
Is it worth delaying action until either we understand the issues better or we have better alternatives available to us

Disputes about the answers

- Even today there is controversy about these basic issues
 - Stern claims that rapid and strong actions are justified
 - Nordhaus claims that we should act, but slowly
 - Dasgupta claims that economics cannot tell us what the answers are

Disagreements about

- Welfare parameters δ and η representing pure rate of time preference and elasticity of marginal utility
- Magnitude of damages from climate changeCosts of mitigating climate change

Welfare parameters

- Pure rate of time preference (prtp) Stern 0%, Nordhaus 3%
- In my opinion, the correct rate is 0%: there is no case for a positive pure rate of time preference cite Sidgwick, Ramsey, Harrod, von Weizacker, Mirlees, ..
- This is a purely ethical choice no economic content at all

Welfare parameters

- But *consumption discount rate* (cdr) can be different from prtp
- η is curvature of payoff function C^η/(1-η), measures risk aversion and redistributive preferences
- Larger η more risk averse and MU of income falls faster. Value increments of income to the rich much less than to the poor

Consumption discount rate

$\bullet \rho = \delta + \eta g(C)$

- Here ρ is the cdr and g(C) is the rate of growth of consumption C
- cdr is rate of change of marginal valuation of C
 With δ = 0, ρ = η g(C) or cdr = elasticity of MU of C x growth rate of C

Welfare parameters

- Dasgupta, Nordhaus and Stern disagree on value of η with D arguing for $\eta = 2$ -4 and N and S for $\eta = 1$
- η is a complex parameter to choose reflects ethical judgments and risk aversion
- Certainly true that 1 is a low number both ethically and from data on RA. Heal & Kristrom use 2-8

Dasgupta's comment

" $\eta = 1$ is to insist that any proportionate increase in someone's C is of equal social worth to that same proportional increase in the C of any other contemporary no matter how rich or poor. With $\delta = 0$ it implies that any proportionate increase in C today is of the same social worth as the same proportional increase at any other date no matter how rich or poor the people then."

Choosing η

- η = 1 implies that \$1 from a person earning
 \$1000 can be compensated by \$1,000,000 to Bill
 Gates
- Higher values imply even sharper tradeoffs
 Empirical evidence on risk aversion does suggest η in the range 2-6

Implication

- With δ = 0 and η = 2-4, or δ = 3 and η = 1, and growth of aggregate consumption at historical rates, there is not a strong economic case for action on CC
 cdr is about 3%
 - Stern sets $\delta = 0$ and $\eta = 1$
- Have to accept N's recommendation that we move slowly
- But these are aggregative one-good models

- With many goods C_i i = 1,...,n we have
 cdr_i = η_{ii} g(C_i) + Σ_{k ≠ i}η_{ik} g(C_k)
 where η_{ik} is the elasticity of the MU of good i wrt
 - changes in consumption of good k
 - Different goods have different cdrs which are not constant
 - If good i is an environmental good then C_i may be <0 and cdr_i may be <0</p>

- So if environmental goods matter and are in declining supply, some cdrs may be zero or negative
- Seems realistic to argue that human welfare is a function of stocks of environmental assets and the services – ecosystem services – that flow from them

Ecosystem services include pollination, carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling, pollination, protection from ozone or from floods, recreational services, existence values,
Considerable evidence that these are of great value and will be damaged by CC

- CC will deplete these assets and the services from them
- So consumption of their services will fall and it is likely that cdrs will be low or negative
- This can justify stronger actions on CC (see An Even Sterner Review)

Cost, Risk & Uncertainty

- Stern estimates costs of CC as equivalent to 5% of GDP in perpetuity taking into account only market effects (no ecosystem services)
- Worrying aspect of CC is small risk of massive disaster – e.g. ice sheet melting, thermohaline circulation changing, mass extinctions, devastating diseases etc.

Cost, Risk & Uncertainty

 Worth paying an insurance premium to reduce this risk

How much depends on same parameters – δ and η
Could be several % of GNP (Heal & Kristrom)
Allowing for risks and for non-market losses – ecosystem services – could place costs of CC in 5-10% range

Costs of abatement

- Stern puts this at around 1%, IPCC at <3%
 Sensitive to policies used, whether market-based or not
- Reality check mitigating CC requires reducing CO2 emissions by 70% which is 20x10⁹ tons at say \$30-60 per ton giving 1-2% world GDP (=\$66x10¹² @ ppp)

Costs of abatement

- Justification for \$30-60 per ton cost of reducing CO2 emissions
 - Can cut back emissions from deforestation about 20% of total – substantially for roughly \$60 per ton
 - Can capture and store CO2 for \$30-50 per ton
 - Non-carbon power sources (nuclear, renewables) competitive at \$50/ton CO2 or less

Gains from delaying?

- Will we have better technologies for mitigation in the future and does it make sense to wait for them?
- Is there any chance we will change our minds over CC?
- Could we use the money better?

Gains from delaying?

Question 1 is pure guesswork
Question 2 the answer seems to be no – the science is now certain
Could we use the money better? The benefit-cost ratio from stopping CC is > 5 – a very good use of our money. Unlikely that we can do better.

Costs from delaying

- Long lags in economic responses to policies once policies are in place
 - Takes energy use 10 years to respond to higher prices
- Long lags in response of climate system to changes in CO2 emissions
 - May be decades
- Need to act now to have an effect in 2040

Bottom Line:

We should act and act now
The economic return to action is high
There are substantial risks from delay